Pedro Sánchez and the Politics of Survival: Spain's Prime Minister Under a Cloud of Scandal!

AsiaNews Iran's Politics Desk: Pedro Sánchez Pérez-Castejón arrived at La Moncloa on June 2, 2018 (12 Khordad 1397), promising to clean up Spanish politics after years of anger over corruption. Eight years later, Spain's prime minister is not personally charged with a crime—but convictions, trials and investigations now reach from one of his most powerful former ministers to his brother, his wife and senior figures around the Spanish Socialist Workers' Party, or PSOE.

That distinction matters. As of August 27, 2026 (5 Shahrivar 1405), no court has charged or convicted Sánchez himself. A serious report must say that plainly. But criminal liability and political responsibility are not the same thing. When so many people close to a leader become entangled in major cases, “I did not know” can begin to sound less like a defence and more like an admission of failed judgment.

The legal question is whether Pedro Sánchez committed a crime. The political question is harder: how many convictions, investigations and reversals can surround a prime minister before “I did not know” becomes a verdict on his leadership?

From an anti-corruption promise to politics of survival

Sánchez rose to power through a no-confidence vote against Mariano Rajoy's government. His promise of cleaner politics was not a slogan invented by today's opposition; it was the moral basis of his own claim to office. That is why the scandals surrounding his circle are so damaging. A politician who enters government under the banner of integrity cannot later argue that personal innocence is the only standard that counts.

The general election of July 23, 2023 (1 Mordad 1402) left the conservative People's Party first with 137 seats, ahead of PSOE with 121, but neither bloc had a majority. Sánchez eventually won re-election on November 16, 2023 (25 Aban 1402), by 179 votes to 171. The vote was constitutionally valid. The political price, however, was support from regional and separatist parties whose votes became indispensable to his survival.

The Catalonia amnesty reversal

The clearest symbol of that bargain was the amnesty law linked to the Catalan independence crisis. Before the election, Sánchez did not present such an amnesty as necessary or defensible. Once he needed the votes of Junts and other regional parties, his position changed. He later acknowledged in an interview with La Sexta that he had changed his mind.

The law entered into force on June 11, 2024 (22 Khordad 1403). Spain's Constitutional Court upheld its central framework in 2025 (1404), while also issuing narrower findings on parts of its design. Criticism should therefore avoid the lazy claim that the entire law was simply declared illegal. The more persuasive criticism is political: did Sánchez change his mind after a genuine constitutional rethink—or after counting the seven votes he needed? The order of events is difficult for him to explain away.

A circle too large to dismiss as coincidence

Sánchez's defenders are right about one thing: sections of the Spanish right and some activist complainants have used litigation as a political weapon, and courts have rejected parts of several complaints. But that fact does not erase final judgments, formal indictments or active proceedings. These cases are no longer merely headlines in hostile newspapers.

The Ábalos case delivered the heaviest political blow. He was not a distant activist or a minor local official; he was a powerful cabinet minister and the organisation secretary of the party Sánchez leads. The Supreme Court sentenced him to more than 24 years in prison. Sánchez says he did not know what Ábalos was doing. That may matter greatly to the prime minister's own criminal exposure, but as an account of political judgment and supervision, it is devastating.

The cases involving Sánchez's family also require legal precision. Begoña Gómez has not been convicted, and prosecutors have challenged the case against her. David Sánchez's conviction is under appeal and is not final. Yet a prime minister cannot reasonably ask the public to treat every investigation as a conspiracy while treating every favourable economic statistic as unquestionable truth. Presumption of innocence protects defendants; it does not abolish political accountability.

asianewsiran.com

Parliament said resign; Sánchez said he would stay

On June 25, 2026 (4 Tir 1405), Spain's Congress of Deputies approved a non-binding resolution calling on Sánchez to resign over the chain of scandals surrounding his party and inner circle. The vote was 177 in favour, 171 against and one abstention. It did not bring down the government, but its political meaning was unmistakable: the same parliament that had returned Sánchez to office with 179 votes in 2023 now contained a majority willing to demand his departure.

Sánchez refused. He has said he intends to continue until the next election, which must be held by August 22, 2027 (31 Mordad 1406). That choice may be lawful. But democratic legitimacy is more than a deadline printed in the constitution. Governing through the narrowest possible parliamentary arithmetic—and through the fear smaller allies have of a right-wing return—is not the same as commanding durable public trust.

A 2026 government still living on a 2023 budget

One of the clearest signs of political weakness is Spain's continued reliance on the 2023 general budget, rolled over through 2024, 2025 and 2026 (1402 to 1405). Budget extensions are legal under Spain's system and keep the state operating. But when an exception becomes the governing method, parliamentary scrutiny and fiscal accountability begin to look optional.

Spain's Independent Authority for Fiscal Responsibility, AIReF, has warned that repeated budget extensions weaken institutional quality and make the government harder to hold to account. Sánchez has proved remarkably skilled at keeping his administration alive. Keeping a government alive, however, is not the same as governing coherently.

The economy is growing—but life has not become easier

A fair criticism of Sánchez must also acknowledge what has gone well. Spain's National Statistics Institute reported that gross domestic product grew by 0.7% in the second quarter of 2026 (spring and summer 1405) compared with the previous quarter and by 2.7% year on year. The unemployment rate fell to 9.87%. These are stronger numbers than those of several large European economies.

But the headline figures are not the whole story. Spain still recorded the European Union's highest unemployment rate in 2025 at about 10.5%. House prices rose by 12.9% year on year in the first quarter of 2026—more than four times the pace of economic growth. Public debt reached roughly €1.729 trillion in May 2026 (Ordibehesht–Khordad 1405), equal to about 100.2% of GDP, even though the debt ratio had improved over the previous year.

So the honest picture is mixed. Employment and growth have improved, but housing has moved further beyond the reach of many young people, public debt remains heavy and distrust has deepened. Sánchez's official Instagram account, @sanchezcastejon, regularly highlights growth and job creation. His opponents fill the same platform with courtroom images and protest footage. The government's mistake is to treat the first half of that picture as reality and the second half as propaganda.

Why Pedro Sánchez matters to Iranian readers

For an Iranian news outlet, Sánchez's record is not merely a Spanish domestic story. On March 4, 2026 (13 Esfand 1404), after the US-Israeli military attack on the Islamic Republic in Iran, he reduced Spain's position to four words: “No a la guerra”—“No to war.” He argued that the operation violated international law and refused to turn Spanish policy into an accessory to military escalation.

Sánchez also condemned the Islamic Republic and the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps. That balance deserves to be recorded. Opposing war is not the same as defending the regime, and many Iranians who reject the Islamic Republic also reject the idea that their country should be devastated by foreign military action.

The harder question is what comes after the slogan. Sánchez has offered powerful language against war, Israel's government and Donald Trump, but much less clarity on how Europe should confront the Islamic Republic's repression of Iranians, state terrorism, missile programme and regional proxy network. Ethics without strategy can quickly become political branding. Iranian readers have learned, painfully, that both militarism and empty diplomacy carry a human cost.

This is precisely where Sánchez's wider political style reappears. He is exceptionally good at finding the morally resonant phrase for a difficult moment. He is less convincing when asked to convert that phrase into a consistent policy that survives contact with power, allies and parliamentary necessity.

The street is no longer quiet

On May 23, 2026 (2 Khordad 1405), tens of thousands of people marched in Madrid demanding Sánchez's resignation. The government estimated the crowd at around 40,000; organisers claimed roughly 120,000. The gap between those estimates is itself part of Spain's war over political reality. What cannot be denied is the image: Spanish flags, calls for resignation and a prime minister who can no longer dismiss public anger as the work of a few hostile media outlets.

Not convicted—but no longer excused

Sánchez's opponents sometimes turn allegations into verdicts before a court has ruled. His supporters make the opposite mistake, throwing convictions, active cases and legitimate questions into a single box labelled “right-wing dirty war.” Both stories are incomplete.

Pedro Sánchez has not been charged or convicted. That legal boundary must be respected. He is also the leader of PSOE, the head of government and the politician who promoted or trusted several people now convicted or under investigation. He reversed course on the Catalan amnesty after separatist votes became essential, governed for years without a new budget, rejected parliament's call to resign and repeatedly responded to scrutiny by questioning the motives of his critics.

Sánchez's central problem is not that a court has found him guilty. It is that he increasingly appears to confuse the absence of a personal conviction with the absence of political responsibility. He presents himself as the last barrier against the far right, then uses fear of that alternative as an argument for remaining in office. A democracy can follow every formal rule and still be weakened when survival becomes the government's main achievement.

Frequently asked questions about Pedro Sánchez

Has Pedro Sánchez been charged with or convicted of corruption?

No. As of August 27, 2026 (5 Shahrivar 1405), Sánchez has not been charged with or convicted of a crime in the cases discussed here. This article distinguishes his legal position from his political responsibility.

Has Begoña Gómez, Sánchez's wife, been convicted?

No. A Madrid court allowed proceedings toward a jury trial to continue over alleged influence peddling and embezzlement, but no conviction has been issued. Prosecutors have sought her acquittal, and the presumption of innocence applies.

Is the conviction of David Sánchez final?

No. The prime minister's brother received a nine-year disqualification from public employment or office for participation in administrative misconduct, but the judgment is under appeal. He was acquitted of influence peddling.

Has Spain's economy performed badly under Sánchez?

A simple “yes” would be misleading. Growth and employment have improved, and Spain has outperformed several large European economies. The sharper criticism concerns the housing crisis, high public debt, persistent unemployment and the gap between national statistics and daily affordability.

Why is Sánchez's policy toward the Islamic Republic relevant to Iranians?

Because he turned opposition to the 2026 US-Israeli military attack into one of Europe's most visible anti-war positions. He also condemned the Islamic Republic and the IRGC, but has not offered a convincing European strategy for confronting the regime's repression, terrorism and proxy network without sacrificing ordinary Iranians.

Sources checked for this report include the official websites of the Spanish government and Congress, Spain's Supreme Court and Constitutional Court, courts in Madrid and Badajoz, the National Statistics Institute, the Bank of Spain, Eurostat, the European Commission, AIReF, Reuters, EFE, RTVE and Pedro Sánchez's official Instagram account. Source names are included for transparency; in keeping with newsroom policy, the article contains no external hyperlinks.

Do you see Pedro Sánchez's decision to remain in office as democratic stability—or as a government clinging to power? Share your view in the comments below this article on AsiaNews Iran.